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Overview 
 
We are responding to the Northern Irish Independent Review of Hate Crime consultation in 
our capacity as experts on social media abuse, online abuse, and online misogyny. We have in 
the past made significant contributions to UN calls for evidence on online harassment, and to 
the Bracadale Review on Hate Crime in Scotland, The One Scotland Hate Crime Legislation 
Review of the Scottish Government, and various UK Parliament inquiries addressing aspects of 
violence against women, gender-based hate, and online misogyny. In addition, we have made 
representations to the Scottish Government as to the need to amend legislation to cover a 
wider range of harassing and abusive behaviours online.  
 
We have recently published a world-leading volume Online Misogyny as a Hate Crime: A 
Challenge for Legal Regulation (Routledge 2019). We have been working on issues relating to 
harassment of women and girls in online spaces since 2013. We are possibly your only evidence 
respondents that have experience of the wider issues surrounding online harassment, and who 
take a holistic approach to the legal problems posed by such harassment, merging criminal 
law, gender, human rights, and internet law expertise.  
 
We are only responding to selected questions from our expert perspectives, focussing on: 
• Gender as part of the hate crime framework  
• online harassment and abuse 
• online misogyny 
• social media abuse 
• online violence against women 
• responsibilities of social media platform providers.  
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QUESTION 11 
Should gender and gender identity be included as protected characteristics in Northern 
Ireland hate crime legislation? 
 
YES.  
 
It is essential that gender is added as a protected characteristic in the NI hate crime legislation. 
This addition would enable the criminal justice system to adequately capture and record crimes 
committed with prejudice and/or hostility and/or bias towards a person on the ground of their 
gender. Whilst adding gender would extend to protecting not only women, this addition would 
particularly enable women to report crimes committed against them because they are women 
– something that has been omitted from the legislation in England & Wales, Scotland, and 
Northern Ireland thus far.1 
 
QUESTION 12 
Should Transgender identity be included as a protected characteristic in Northern Ireland 
hate crime legislation? 
 
NO.  
 
As explained in the answer to Q11, adding gender would cover other groups, including 
transgender.  
 
QUESTION 18 
Do you consider that intersectionality is an important factor to be taken into consideration in 
any new hate crime legislation? 
 
YES.  
 
Intersectional approach is crucial to enable the official recognition of the fact that protected 
characteristics frequently intersect and are a key factor motivating hostility on not just a single 
ground (e.g. religion and gender). This approach would allow for greater visibility of multiple 
factors motivating hostility as well as improved recording of data on hate crimes – especially 
disaggregated data.  
 
QUESTION 19 
If you consider intersectionality to be an important factor to be taken into consideration in 
any new hate crime legislation, what is the best way to achieve this? 
 
Please see Q18 above. Whilst it is not currently possible to uplift a sentence in lieu of all 
protected characteristics that played a role in motivating the commission of the criminal act, 
it is nonetheless crucial that adequate records are provided (including police records, 
 
1 K Barker & O Jurasz, Online Misogyny as a Hate Crime: A Challenge for Legal Regulation? (2019) 100-104. 
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sentencing remarks etc.) listing all protected characteristics in relation to which the hostility 
was demonstrated. This enables greater visibility of the context in which a crime was 
committed and factors that played a role in its commission. It also gives an official recognition 
of a number of harms, including social harms, suffered by the victims – especially where two 
or more characteristics intersect.2  
 
QUESTION 21 
Do you believe there is a need to introduce a statutory aggravation model of hate crime law 
similar to that which exists in Scotland and in England and Wales under the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998? 
 
YES.  
 
A statutory aggravation based on gender hostility should be introduced. However, it must be 
recognised that a standalone aggravation is unlikely to ‘fit’ within the current hate crime 
statutory framework because there must be a protected characteristic enshrined in the law 
first. Therefore, we advocate for the introduction of gender as a protected characteristic in 
order to allow for a statutory aggravation to also be developed. 
 
QUESTION 22 
In dealing with an aggravated offence, should the court state on conviction that the offence 
was aggravated? 
 
YES.  
 
It is essential that the courts state that the offence was aggravated and elaborate as to the 
reasons why. This is crucial to ensure transparency as well as adequate recording of hate 
crimes within the official legal documents, such as sentencing remarks and judgments. Such 
statement would also be meaningful to the victims of hate crimes in that it would provide 
explicit and official recognition of the fact that hostility was a factor in commission of the 
offence against them.  
 
 
QUESTION 30 
Whether or not you believe that the term “hostility” should be defined or not, do you consider 
that this term should be expanded to include other terms such as “bias, hostility, prejudice, 
bigotry or contempt”? 
 
NO.  
 
In legal context, all six terms listed in the question would have specific and different meaning, 
as well as legal threshold to satisfy each of them. Therefore, it is not helpful to expand the 
 
2 K Barker & O Jurasz, Online Misogyny as a Hate Crime: A Challenge for Legal Regulation? (2019) 31-32, 101-102. 
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understanding of hostility to include these terms as this is likely going to lead to more 
confusion than clarity, especially in the legal application of these terms.   
 
QUESTION 35 
If gender, gender identity, age or other groups are included in the protected groups, should 
they also be included under the groups protected by the stirring up provisions in Part III of the 
Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987? 
 
YES.  
 
We are of the view that there should be no hierarchy within the protected characteristics.3 
The stirring up offences ought to be applied equally to all protected characteristics. The 
categories of protected characteristics operate in recognition of the fact that there are 
particular vulnerabilities attached to groups of people with certain features. Whilst there are 
historical and social reasons for the existing hierarchy, the only way to equalise this is to ensure 
that the stirring up offences are extended to cover all protected characteristics. 
 
QUESTION 40: 
Should social media companies be compelled under legislation to remove offensive material 
posted online? 
 
YES. 
 
It is unclear both within the question, and within the consultation paper itself what it is that is 
meant by offensive within the parameters of the hate crime landscape. There is a need to 
clarify what offensive material means, and whether something that is offensive can amount to 
hateful. Existing legislation does not define the term ‘online hate’ nor it is clarified through the 
common law. There exists a tendency to use terms ‘online hate’ and ‘online offensive material’ 
interchangeably, which leads not only to confusion, but also to inadequate provisions where 
there are legislative responses. There is of course, an overlap, and hateful content can – and is 
– posted online but there is a difference between offense, and hate.  As we stated in 2017: 
 
“‘online abuse’ refers to a much broader problem and can take a multiplicity of forms, 
not least that of online hate speech. Furthermore, not all abuse online amounts to 
online hate – a specific threshold would need to be satisfied in order to classify an 
instance of online abuse as an emanation of online hate.”  
 
The challenge created by interchangeable terminology is a point illustrated by the 
Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion which 
commented on ‘online abuse’ more broadly, without drawing a clear distinction 
between online abuse, online hate speech and online hate crime.4 Furthermore, the 
 
3 K Barker & O Jurasz, Online Misogyny as a Hate Crime: A Challenge for Legal Regulation? (2019) 95.  
4 Report of the Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Prejudice and Community Cohesion (September 2016) 17 
(para.30). 
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Report narrowly refers to occurrences of ‘bullying or hate crime through social media 
platforms’ which fails to take into account other forms of online abuse which may, 
subject to the required threshold, be seen as forms of online hate.    
 
Secondly, the dichotomy between online and offline environments needs to be 
challenged when addressing online hate (and online abuse in general). Traditionally, 
online and offline environments are viewed as separate and detached from one 
another. In particular, this is exacerbated by the perception that online is ‘not real’5 
which then translates into flawed attitudes towards online and offline forms of abuse 
and violence. Very often hate starts online, and translates into acts of violence 
committed offline, resulting not only in multiple harms suffered by victims but also an 
identifiable transference of harm between what is perceived to be the ‘online’ and 
‘offline’ contexts.”6 
  
Equally, “Content which is not illegal but harmful should be categorised differently and 
subjected to a different review process. Segregating content between that which is 
illegal, and that which is harmful but not illegal may be one method of mitigating the 
volume of content to be dealt with in short time frames.”7 
 
Social media companies struggle to deal with the volume of content posted online, and have 
not shown the capability to – reliably – act on content which is already illegal. Whilst there 
ought to be responsibility imposed on social media companies, the responsibility must be one 
which is workable otherwise there is little benefit to legislating on the point. There is also, of 
course, the issue concerning the location of the content and the illegality of the content in a 
particular jurisdiction. While there is ongoing law reform in other areas, we recommend that 
this point is considered in light of those. 
 
QUESTION 41: 
Are there lessons from the English and Welsh experience of the Public Order Act 1986 that 
may apply for Northern Ireland?  
 
YES.  
 
The provisions of the Public Order Act 1986 do not adequately capture the online elements of 
hate. There are gaps within sections 4, 4A and 5 which – whilst these sections could apply to 
social media – have hurdles in respect of the need to have someone within hearing or sight 
distance of the person making the threats.8 Such proximity elements – whilst essential for 
 
5 K Barker and O Jurasz, ‘Gender, Human Rights and Cybercrime: Are Virtual Worlds really that different?’, in: M. Asimow, K. 
Brown, D. Papke (eds) Law and Popular Culture: International Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2014). 
6 K Barker & O Jurasz, ‘Submission of Evidence to Scottish Government Independent Review of Hate Crime Legislation’ 
(November 2017) 
http://oro.open.ac.uk/52612/1/Hate%20Crime%20Legislation%20Review%20%28Barker%20%26%20Jurasz%29.pdf 
7 K Barker & O Jurasz, ‘Online Harms White Paper Consultation Response’ (June 2019) (on file with author). 
8 K Barker & O Jurasz, Online Misogyny as a Hate Crime: A Challenge for Legal Regulation? (2019), 55.  
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offline instances of potentially hateful behaviours, are problematic for the online application 
of such provisions. 
 
QUESTION 43: 
Should the term “publication” in the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 be amended 
to include “posting or uploading material online”? 
 
YES.  
 
While the Public Order (NI) Order 1987 includes a definition of publication, this is not clearly 
defined as capturing material online. The current terminology in the Order deals with what 
amounts to a dissemination to the public but this does not expressly capture ‘online’ posting 
and sharing of content. Given that online posting and uploading is tantamount to publishing (a 
point social media companies are at pains to highlight so as to benefit from the lack of 
monitoring and editing roles, and the shield provided by the eCommerce Directive liability 
shield), there is a need to alter the term to include the publication of written material via online 
platforms. 
 
 
QUESTION 44: 
Should there be an explicit defence of “private conversations” in the Public Order (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1987 to uphold privacy protection? 
 
YES.   
 
Private conversations should be protected but given the lack of encryption on some platforms, 
the ideal of a privacy protection is one that requires some consistency. Similarly, by ‘private 
conversations’ what is envisaged here? One to one conversations and messages, messaging 
app uses, or for example, direct messaging on Twitter? One size fits all is a good starting point 
as a concept but is unworkable. For instance, if there is a hateful message directly sent via 
twitter, would the privacy protection prevent any action being taken? Ordinary privacy rights 
are all subject to limitation in the event of necessary situations so unless an inviolable right to 
privacy is envisaged, this will be difficult to implement, and could have dangerous unforeseen 
consequences.   
 
 
QUESTION 45: 
Should gender, gender identity, age and other characteristics be included as protected 
characteristics under the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987?  
 
YES.  
 
Gender should be included as a protected characteristic. This is necessary for consistency, but 
also because to continue to omit it from the Public Order (NI) Order 1987 would be to 
perpetuate a hierarchy of harms. Furthermore, in amending the Order, this would allow other  
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categories of behaviour to be captured, and would feed into the consistency with other 
jurisdictions in the UK. 
 
QUESTION 46: 
Should the Malicious Communications (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 be adapted to deal 
with online behaviour? 
 
YES.  
 
The focus of the Malicious Communications (NI) Order 1988 is on letters. Given the date at 
which this provision was introduced, there is a need to update it to reflect the ways in which 
communications can be malicious. The absence of online content coverage in the Order is 
problematic given the ways in which we communicate now. Ultimately, not amending the 
Order to include scope to capture online communications such as direct messages, emails, or 
other digital communications would be to mean the provisions are essentially not fit for 
purpose.9 
 
 
QUESTION 47: 
Should the wording of the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the Malicious 
Communications (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, the Malicious Communications (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1988 and the Communications Act 2003 use terms such as “grossly offensive”, 
“indecent” and “obscene”? 
 
YES.   
 
Yes. The wording of the Malicious Communications Act 1988, The Malicious Communications 
(NI) Order 1988, and the Communications Act 2003 should all adopt the same wording, and 
the same definitions for the behaviours and activities envisaged to be captured within their 
scope. Moreover, “the existing legislative framework appears to deal effectively with some 
isolated incidents of abusive behaviour online although fails to address instances of online hate 
under hate crime laws because online hate perpetrated through abusive communications 
currently falls outside of the current provisions.”10 Given the focus of the current review, it is 
important to place the potential proposals within the lens of hate provisions too, so that 
instances of online hate can be adequately captured, and where applicable, the relevant 
aggravator applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
9 K Barker & O Jurasz, Online Misogyny as a Hate Crime: A Challenge for Legal Regulation? (2019), 68.  
10 K Barker & O Jurasz, ‘Submission of Evidence to Scottish Government Independent Review of Hate Crime Legislation’ 
(November 2017) 
http://oro.open.ac.uk/52612/1/Hate%20Crime%20Legislation%20Review%20%28Barker%20%26%20Jurasz%29.pdf, 4.  
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QUESTION 48: 
Are the offences under the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the Malicious 
Communications (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, the Malicious Communications (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1988 and Communications Act 2003 too broadly drafted and require some 
modification to clarify and narrow their application? 
 
YES.  
 
Please see above at Question 47.  
 
 
QUESTION 49: 
Should online harm be part of a general law applying to hate crime?   
 
The UK Government programme of business currently includes work on the Online Harms 
legislation. That said, whilst there is a need for online harm to be considered within the scope 
of hate crime, there is a need for the Online Harms provisions to appropriately capture online 
harms that are misogynistic in nature and motivation. This is not currently a feature of the 
proposals, and such harm is not listed amongst the 23 harms the Government envisage 
capturing in their White Paper. Online harms is a broad concept – understandably – but in 
order to avoid the creation and legislative implementation of a hierarchy of harms,11 care 
needs to be taken to ensure that this is carefully addressed. 
 
As we have stated elsewhere, “there is a pressing need for a greater understanding and 
acknowledgment of harm caused by online abuse communications generally and online hate 
specifically.12 Although the vast majority of reported instances on online hate involve 
celebrities and public figures, it is crucial that a clear message is sent through the legal system 
that online hate can affect anyone, irrespective of their public status. To that end, the focus 
should always remain on the person affected – irrespective of their gender – rather than their 
public status and should be given equal importance and consideration. This approach 
reinforces the importance and applicability of the principle of non-discrimination and equality 
before the law to cases involving online hate and online misogyny in particular. Furthermore, 
these principles are enshrined in the UK equality legislation as well as a number of international 
instruments which are ratified by the UK,13 and which therefore create legally binding 
obligations. 
 
11 K Barker & O Jurasz, ‘Text-based (sexual) abuse and violence against women: towards law reform?’ in J Bailey, A Flynn & N 
Henry (eds), Handbook on Technology-Facilitate Violence and Abuse: International Perspectives and Experiences 
(forthcoming 2021). 
12 K Barker and O Jurasz, ‘Online misogyny as hate crime: tweeting sense, slaying trolls’ (Society of Legal Scholars 
Conference, Dublin, September 2017).  
13 Examples include: Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination), Protocol 12 to the ECHR (equality before the law), 
Article 20 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (equality before the law), Article 15 Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 1979 (women’s equality with men before the law), Article 3 (equal rights of men and women 
to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights) & Article 26 (equality before the law) International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.  
